tv [untitled] March 14, 2013 6:30pm-7:00pm PDT
design criteria and the dvs led the consulting to the tjpa to make sure that the recommendations coming from urs, were reasonable and prudent. and did not not over or under address, the concerns and the nature of the facility and more appropriate for the nature of the facility. widening the associates and specializes in particular, on structural and blast analysis, and vehicle force protection. they have one in 64 years of experience, in that arena since experience with federal laboratories, courthouses embassies, as well as working on the pentagon and many of the same facilities in the city of
new york, where dvs has addressed general security issues. they have focused on blast and force protection on those facilities. also as part of the peer review and consulting team to tjpa is code consultants ink. cci, and they focus particularly on fire protection and fire life safety issues and were extensively involved in the peer review of the bus fire and train fire scenarios, designed basis fire, designations. in addition to cci, we do have a two-person fire design peer review panel that was selected by the san francisco fire department to provide them with expert advice on the smoke analysis being performed at the
station, particularly the comp utation, fluid analysis of how the smoke would be propagated and behave over time in the event of a bus or a train fire. also it is significant to note that we have the structural and seismic review committee that has been working with the tjpa and the department of building inspection since the beginning of the project, looking at the structural performance of the building, particularly, in seismic events, code-related is issues, but is also taken a look at some of the blast-related discussions. >> so, with that, i am going to ask dennis signs of urs to come up and speak a little bit to the rba process. dennis is with the urs corporation and has 30 years of
experience in anti-terrorism force protection and physical security. specializes in vunerbility threat and risk assessments and counter terrorism measures. for both state, federal, local, and international clients for rail, subway, bus, tunnel, bridge and air transportation facilities. so with that, i will turn it over to dennis to talk more about the rba. >> before dennis comes up i am looking at the length of the presentation, some of it was presented to the board in terms of why we, or the staff believes that this terminal is an important site for the additional security protections. so i would like you to go through it still, but if we could condense it down and abbreviate it and leave it open for questions from board members that would be great.
>> so thank you for having me, today. i want to talk a little bit about the pedigree. to conduct, project of this scale, scope and complexity, it is a pretty big project. urs is a recognized security consultant on behalf of the department of homeland security and they come to us often looking at vuner ability assessments and have an incredible wealth of knowledge and background. we have assessed severity and thefts over 500 facilities nationwide and that is only in the united states that i am addressing today. >> the project support that we provide is more than 30 nationwide surface transportations, which includes, rail, subway, tunnel, bridges, transportation venues, urs has supported more than 400
of the fortune 500 firms and state, and law law enforcement we have a workforce of over 50,000 individuals and have the much sought after safety act certification. the individuals that we used on the subject matter team and portion of this, they have got a wealth of background, and very indepth, we have phds in there. you have got, structural engineers. pes, hvac, meps, there is a whole range of law enforcement. so we brought a wealth of experience and a lot of people to this particular project. who have good experience with transportation, i should say that all of these individuals have transportation backgrounds as well. >> one of the reasons that urs is in a very good position to look at the transit center is because of our out reach, we have got extraordinary advantage to access and look at
threatening information on a daily basis that is due in part to the contracts that we hold. some classified and some open. this access is conducted on a constant basis and we use it to validate the threats so that we know what is going on every day of the week. we look at and weekends. we look at the intelligence programs that we have, again, we have got some classified contracts. that will allow us to look at closed source information, not available to the public. and open source information which, of course, is. what that does is allows us to provide fidelity. modality is how a weapon is delivered, it could be somebody with a backpack or a vehicle. the focus of this vunerbility assessment, is that you look at all hazards for public safety. we did not only look at man made.
in california for your natural hazards you have seismic requirements. so they can in fact harden the building to buy down some of the exposure that you would have to a terrorist event. so we look at for natural hazards, earthquake and wind and flooding and you can see the subheaders from there. the technological and this is what one should do when you are conducting vunerbility. and technological hazards or hazards that are accidents and think of india and hazmat event, something where the transit center night not be the target. but they will receive collateral damage. some of these are very important to look at, scoring them cals and radiology and hospitals. >> have you to look at it across the board and we look at
above and underground storage tanks and pipelines and if they rupture how will that effect the transit center. rail and air, of course your standard hazmat events, a truck something like that on the street near or around the center itself. man made is criminal acts, violence against property and in relation to the transit center. you think that everything from a violent act to graffiti, how are you going to try to buy down that threat and risk. we look at fire events, and plan to be 100-year building within those 100 years, we anticipate that you will have a fire event, a trash, can or a bus so we need recommendations and design criteria that would take care of those issues. cyber, obviously is a huge one.
were you going to ask me a question? >> no. cyber, integrity management, the mass notification systems that would also support not only a man made event but any of the natural hazards but the technical hazards and then of course terrorism, we look at a number of things, i have just given you a small amount here, a vehicle approach, explosive event from... >> i am hoping that we can skip to the design categories because this is something that was already covered at last month's meeting, the next couple of slides. >> so you tell me when to stop, okay? >> no. the facility protective design, yes, right here.
>> okay. >> primarily, if you have the other material, in this presentation, i encourage you to look it over, obviously. these recommendations that we have made, we believe are important to the process. we believe it based on the information that we have, we would not have suggested it, or recommended that you implement without feeling that it was necessary. basis on what urs does, our reach back, all of the knowledge that we have and everything that goes into it, it is not a small project and includes an enormous number of analysis and data points. rba did work with the other peer reviews, the other peer reviewers as bob beck pointed out, with difficult task, one that we really welcomed. >> i think that there was a
slide for facility design. >> we swapped it. >> fine, great, thank you. >> bob is going to take care of that one >> we used rational credibility threats and modalities and we used protective designs at comparable facilities throughout the united states. if you look at it, basically this agency is on the same type of facility, that we have in chicago, philly, boston, washington, d.c., areas around the country that need protection. the only other thing that i think that i would add to this is that, you know, this is something that you need to do. this is, we did not come up with anything and there is no fluff in here and there is nothing that can't be supported with the documentation that we provided. and i will hand it off to bob
beck. >> unless the team has any questions on rba. >> there is still two more slides that i will assume that bob ask going to go through them. >> okay. >> i guess that i just want to reiterate my comment from last presentation. i personally do not want to second guess, the measures taken to ensure the safety of this facility, i'm interested in options for getting the budget balanced. so, i don't think any of us need convincing about the need to do this. >> well, i do have some questions. >> but, maybe i could just ask them in advance. >> also. >> sure. >> because we have, i think that we went over this last month. and so for me, some of my questions, are on what is it that we need to do to get certified by dhs? and is this entire package what is going to kind-of get us to the dhs certification?
or are there things that are maybe not needed by dhs to get certified? my second question is, is this something that we can fill? and so, first we will be opening the bus terminal eventually, we will be opening the cal train dtx and in the long term high speed rail and as we add the components to the terminal, obviously the security measures that we are talking about are you know going to be more, necessary, and needed as you know this terminal attracts more and more people and more and more attention and so i am curious as to whether this package can be scaled and i don't know if other directors want to ask the question and direct the presentation a little bit. >> i guess that i have a couple and i think that generally, i would agree with director metcalf that it is not a question of whether this board wants this to be a safe and
secure facility. but i think that there is a question, as the last speaker was coming out and trying to answer the question of how to buy-down risk and i think that there is another question of at what cost and i don't think that we have seen anything quantitative here in terms, i mean that there is risk benefit, analysis, that has to go into seismic safety decisions to hazmat safety decision to all of these. but that is something that we have not gotten any sense of, and i would ask the question last time and i don't think that i heard or understand an answer of we are talking about something like 64 million dollars of additional cost, but i presume that the original design did not include zero considerations for safety. so it would still be helpful to know what the total cost is at 64 plus what? and then, i guess one other question at this point, related to the chair's question is, how
and when and why was the policy decision made to secure this security act designation? push director ortiz? >> okay. >> okay. i appreciate the questions and i will try to go through and address each of them. and may call on dennis to expand on a couple of points here. first is the question that you raised chair kim on the nature of the facility as it changes over time and how risk and threat profiles may change over time. that was the subject of some discussion, and where feasible and appropriate in assessing the cost and making certain
improvements where feasible and appropriate to include those improvements in phase two, we have not included the cost for those here. there are obviously some that were design guidance criteria that related specifically to the rail levels of the building, to address potential threats on those levels, all of those costs are included in the phase two build out of the below grade level. there are also some locations above grade where it may be feasible for us to provide a fully redundant security operation center. what we have recommended in the numbers, going forward is to have our security operations center within the facility. and then to have an area designated as a... or that would be a conference room under normal conditions and but
should the security operation's center be unavailable that will be our security operation's center during phase one. that is our alternate location. but, the build out of the fully secondary secondary operation center would be in phase two, and so where feasible and appropriate, we are phasing things. the... in terms of the safety act certification this is something that i may ask denise to expand on, they look through each element of the building and the same types of categories as the rva went through and so to have a full certification for the facility, each of those areas needs to be addressed.
that is possible to have certification of systems within the building, but not the building as a whole. but the certification process would look at each of the systems and elements of protective design and they would look at what was recommended and was that implemented. do you have... >> right, and i should add the director to further respond to your question. the reason that we updated the risk and vunerbility assessment was not to obtain safety act designation and certification, it was done because of the reasons that were presented in the last board meeting which we will not go into because of purposes of time it is the right thing to do and based on fema guidelines and we were at a point in time where we did the first rva analysis where we were in the schematic phase and the design was not mature enough when it got to that point, we did the update again with urs and the other teams
that were mentioned. it just so happens that the work we did, allows us to apply for safety acts and security designation and we will most likely get it, but we did not do the work to obtain the certification or designation. we don't have to do it but it would be wise to do it from a liability standpoint and we went into the legal reasons last time, but i did want to give you that understanding. i don't know, if you want to add to that? >> maria is right, you do that to liability and established by the department of homeland security and you did go over it last time and i saw your presentation last time. having achieved and won the certification from dhs, he used the dhs methodology from science and technology who award the safety act certification and we used it to the letter so that everything that have recommended in here will hopefully will meet and i am only saying hopefully that it is at one percent and but we
have used it to addressed security elements and survivebility elements everything that one would need to achieve that designation, and so we have kind of met the letter of law at this point in time. were there any other questions on the safety act that i have not touched on that you want to here about? >> i guess that there isn't a set criteria of what would grant us a certification by dhs, that we as a board could look at. in relationship to what is being proposed to the board. >> it is a checklist. it is almost a checklist that you use. >> there is a checklist. >> it is like this, but it is not a checklist, let me see how this goes. >> you have a methodology that dhs wants you to use and we used that. supporting that is a checklist like this, where you go through and you figure out what all of the threats are, all of the vunerbilities and the mitigation measures and we look at all of the drawings at the 95 percent to make sure that we have got all of that covered at
believe that we have in san francisco. but i don't think that there is a reason for us to talk about that. i think that for me, and purely looking at this from a fiscal lens. i want to do what is necessary to ensure that we are safe and keeping this terminal safe and ensure that that is exactly what we are doing and not any more. >> no, no foundations that we provided to assure that. >> so, could i ask, bob? when you listed the different subject matter experts, you had said, at one point there was somebody on that list that was there to determine what the right level of investment was to get the right address level of risk not too much, not too little? i missed which anti that was that was making that determination. >> well, in general, in the three firms that have been conducting with us most closely on the rva are dvs, which was
bob dusabelo who spoke with you last month and is here today. because he has a breath across a large number of projects, can provide us with commentary as to the standard of practice. and being employed on other projects across the united states. working with him, looking specifically at perimeter protection and blasts for both the structure and the glazing was widlinger and associates and consulting, specializing in the fire design basis threats and smoke analysis was co-consultant's inc and so three of them were working with us to review the recommendations that were
coming from urs and providing advice to us in evaluating the design, guidance and criteria, whether those were prudent and reasonable given the defined design basis threats and the standard of care in the industry. >> and did your program manager, or program management oversight consultant do any kind of evaluation on the reasonableness scale? >> well, they assisted us in you know, reviewing cost estimates for these. and also, we had or did and program management consultant was instrumental in the conversation about the design
guidance criteria often describes a measure that should be taken. and the initially valuation by the design team quite often was a very literal interpretation of a design, guidance criteria and so where, we had design guidance criteria that had high costs or unanticipated costs. we did with the pmo say, well is there another way of addressing the threat? is the design guidance criteria and is there multiple ways to change the way that it could be implemented and the change for the cost basis? and so reviewing the implementation of the design guidance criteria and the cost implications of it the project management, program management and program controls team was very instrumental in that. >> thank you.
>> okay. >> so, in total, the categories of protective design measures that we discussed and have grouped all of the design guidance criteria into it are listed here. and i think that it is important to note that while there are some things that are very much related to terrorism, or to specific types of threats, that would be associated with terrorism, a lot of the recommendations and a lot of the costs that are recommending to be incurred are really multihazard-threat related. so they will add to the performance of the building in our ability to safely protect occupants and evacuate people
whether it is an earthquake, or whether it is a fire, and an accidental fire or a man-made threat. and so, a lot of the costs are in the ability to manage evacuation response and recovery and visual awareness of the entire building. >> the one other thing that i have known about this is that the recommended change in the facade of the building would reduce the impact here by an additional 7 and a half million dollars. so that is part of the reason for the recommendation that you will be hearing about. >> bob? >> yes. >> and maybe, it is part of the question. when we were considering the budget, did we, i mean, this
thing about management and all of the things that are non-terrorist related, we didn't take into account that we are not included or what? we just... >> no, they were included and you will see that the... of all of the categories here, managing and dealing with bus and frame fires, there is a relatively small impact there where there was not an impact there. was really consideration of additional scenarios. where for instance, two buses could be on fire at the same time and rather than a single bus, so, it was increasing in the fire sprinkler density. and additional fire pumps. so there is some changes there
that within that category, but, there is also a category of national institute of science and technology recommendations for a lot of these types of systems that both exiting stairwells that go above and beyond code and so, there were all of these events were addressed in the original design and the original estimates. but, the, some of the recommendations are relying on the mised recommendations that were developed after the world trade center events to really go above and beyond kind of the base line code to take additional steps to make sure that both individuals can be evacuated from a building, and but that emergency responders can enter the building. and in a way that they don't